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Abstract—We consider repeated multi-player games in which
players repeatedly and simultaneously choose strategies from
a finite set of available strategies according to some strategy
adjustment process. We focus on the specific class of weakly
acyclic games, which is particularly relevant for multi-agent
cooperative control problems. A strategy adjustment process
determines how players select their strategies at any stage as
a function of the information gathered over previous stages.
Of particular interest are “payoff based” processes, in which
at any stage, players only know their own actions and (noise
corrupted) payoffs from previous stages. In particular, players
do not know the actions taken by other players and do not
know the structural form of payoff functions. We introduce
three different payoff based processes for increasingly general
scenarios and prove that after a sufficiently large number of
stages, player actions constitute a Nash equilibrium at any stage
with arbitrarily high probability. We also show how to modify
player utility functions through tolls and incentives in so-called
congestion games, a special class of weakly acyclic games, to
guarantee that a centralized objective can be realized as a Nash
equilibrium. We illustrate the methods with a simulation of
distributed routing over a network.
I. INTRODUCTION
The objective in distributed cooperative control for multi-
agent systems is to enable a collection of “self-interested”
agents to achieve a desirable “collective” objective. There
are two overriding challenges to achieving this objective.
The first is complexity: finding an optimal solution by a
centralized algorithm may be prohibitively difficult when
there are large numbers of interacting agents. This motivates
the use of adaptive methods that enable agents to “self
organize” into suitable, if not optimal, collective solutions.
The second challenge is limited information. Agents may
have limited knowledge about the status of other agents,
except perhaps for a small subset of “neighboring” agents.
An example is collective motion control for mobile sensor
platforms (e.g., [2]). In these problems, mobile sensors
seek to position themselves to achieve various collective
objectives such as rendezvous or area coverage. Sensors can
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communicate with neighboring sensors, but otherwise do not
have global knowledge of the domain of operation or the
status and locations of non-neighboring sensors.
A typical assumption is that agents are endowed with a
reward or utility function that depends on their own strategies
and the strategies of other agents. In motion coordination
problems, for example, an agent’s utility function typically
depends on its position relative to other agents or environ-
mental targets, and knowledge of this function guides local
motion adjustments.
In other situations, agents may know nothing about the
structure of their utility functions, and how their own utility
depends on the actions of other agents (whether local or far
away). In this case the only thing they can do is observe
rewards based on experience and “optimize” on a trial and
error basis. The situation is further complicated because
all agents are trying simultaneously to optimize their own
strategies. Therefore, even in the absence of noise, an agent
trying the same strategy twice may see different results
because of the non-stationary nature of the strategies of other
agents.
There are several examples of multi-agent systems that
illustrate this situation. In distributed routing for ad hoc data
networks (e.g., [3]), routing nodes seek to route packets
to neighboring nodes based on packet destinations without
knowledge of the overall network structure. The objective
is to minimize the delay of packets to their destinations.
This delay must be realized through trial and error, since the
functional dependence of delay on routing strategies is not
known. A similar problem is automotive traffic routing, in
which drivers seek to minimize the congestion experienced
to get to a desired destination. Drivers can experience the
congestion on selected routes as a function of the routes
selected by other drivers, but drivers do not know the
structure of the congestion function. Finally, in a multi-
agent approach to designing manufacturing systems (e.g.,
[4]), it may not be known in advance how performance
measures (such as throughput) depend on manufacturing
policy. Rather performance can only be measured once a
policy is implemented.
Our interest in this paper is to develop algorithms that
enable coordination in multi-agent systems for precisely this
“payoff based” scenario, in which agents only have access
to (possibly noisy) measurements of the rewards received
through repeated interactions with other agents. We adopt the
framework of “learning in games” (see [5], [6], [7], [8] for
an extensive overview). Unlike most of the learning rules in
this literature, which assume that agents adjust their behavior
based on the observed behavior of other agents, we shall
assume that agents know only their own past actions and
the payoffs that resulted. It is far from obvious that Nash
equilibrium can be achieved under such a restriction, but in
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fact it has recently been shown that such “payoff based”
learning rules can be constructed that work in any game [9],
[10].
In this paper we show that there are simpler and more
intuitive adjustment rules that achieve this objective for a
large class of multi-player games known as “weakly acyclic”
games. This class captures many problems of interest in
cooperative control [11], [12]. It includes the very special
case of “identical interest” games, where each agent receives
the same reward. However, weakly acyclic games (and the
related concept of potential games) capture other scenarios
such as congestion games [13] and similar problems such as
distributed routing in networks, weapon target assignment,
consensus, and area coverage. See [14], [15] and referenced
therein for a discussion of a learning in games approach
to cooperative control problems, but under less stringent
assumptions on informational constraints considered in this
paper.
For many multi-agent problems, operation at a pure Nash
equilibrium may reflect optimization of a collective objec-
tive.1 We will derive payoff based dynamics that guarantee
asymptotically that agent strategies will constitute a pure
Nash equilibrium with arbitrarily high probability. It need
not always be the case that at least one Nash equilibrium
optimizes a collective objective. Motivated by this consider-
ation, we also discuss the introduction of incentives or tolls
in a player’s payoff function to assure that there is at least
one Nash equilibrium that optimizes a collective objective.
Even in this case, however, there may still be suboptimal
Nash equilibria.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 provides background on finite strategic-form games
and repeated games. This is followed by three types of
payoff based dynamics in Section 3 for increasingly gen-
eral problems. Section 3.1 presents “Safe Experimentation
Dynamics” which is restricted to identical interest games.
Section 3.2 presents “Simple Experimentation Dynamics”
for the more general class of weakly acyclic games but
with noise free payoff measurements. Section 3.3 presents
“Sample Experimentation Dynamics” for weakly acyclic
games with noisy payoff measurements. Section 4 discusses
how to introduce tolls and incentives in payoffs so that a
Nash equilibrium optimizes a collective objective. Section 5
presents an illustrative example of a traffic congestion game.
Finally, Section 6 contains some concluding remarks. An im-
portant analytical tool throughout is the method of resistance
trees for perturbed Markov chains [18], which is reviewed
in the appendix of [1]. We will omit many of the proofs
for brevity. The complete proofs can be found in the journal
version of this paper [1].
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we will present a brief background of
the game theoretic concepts used in the paper. We refer the
readers to [19], [7], [8] for a more comprehensive review.
A. Finite Strategic-Form Games
Consider a finite strategic-form game with n-player set
P := {P1, ...,Pn} where each player Pi ∈ P has an action
1Nonetheless, there are varied viewpoints on the role of Nash equilibrium
as a solution concept for multi-agent systems. See [16] and [17].
set Yi and a utility function Ui : Y → R where Y = Y1 ×
...×Yn. We will sometimes use a single symbol, e.g., G, to
represent the entire game, i.e., the player set, P , action sets,
Yi, and utility functions Ui.
For an action profile y = (y1, y2, ..., yn) ∈ Y , let y−i
denote the profile of player actions other than player Pi,
i.e., y−i = {y1, . . . , yi−1, yi+1, . . . , yn} . With this notation,
we will sometimes write a profile y of actions as (yi, y−i).
Similarly, we may write Ui(y) as Ui(yi, y−i).
An action profile y∗ ∈ Y is called a pure Nash equilibrium
if for all players Pi ∈ P ,
Ui(y∗i , y
∗
−i) = max
yi∈Yi
Ui(yi, y∗−i). (1)
In this paper we will consider three classes of games:
identical interest games, potential games, and weakly acyclic
games. Each class of games has a connection to general
cooperative control problems and multi-agent systems for
which there is some global utility or potential function
φ : Y →R that a global planner seeks to maximize [11].
1) Identical Interest Games: The most restrictive class of
games that we will review in this paper is identical interest
games. In such a game, the players’ utility functions {Ui}ni=1
are chosen to be the same. That is, for some function φ :
Y → R, Ui(y) = φ(y), for every Pi ∈ P and for every
y ∈ Y . It is easy to verify that all identical interest games
have at least one pure Nash equilibrium, namely any action
profile y that maximizes φ(y).
2) Potential Games: A significant generalization of an
identical interest game is a potential game. In a potential
game, the change in a player’s utility that results from a
unilateral change in strategy equals the change in the global
utility. Specifically, there is a function φ : Y →R such that
for every player Pi ∈ P , for every y−i ∈ Y−i, and for every
y′i, y
′′
i ∈ Yi,
Ui(y′i, y−i)− Ui(y′′i , y−i) = φ(y′i, y−i)− φ(y′′i , y−i).
When this condition is satisfied, the game is called a potential
game with the potential function φ. It is easy to see that, in
potential games, any action profile maximizing the potential
function is a pure Nash equilibrium, hence every potential
game possesses at least one such equilibrium.
3) Weakly Acyclic Games: Consider any finite game G
with a set Y of action profiles. A better reply path is a
sequence of action profiles y1, y2, ..., yL such that, for every
1 ≤  ≤ L − 1, there is exactly one player Pi such that
i) yi = y+1i , ii) y−i = y+1−i , and iii) Ui(y) < Ui(y+1).
In other words, one player moves at a time, and each time
a player moves he increases his own utility.
Suppose now that G is a potential game with potential
function φ. Starting from an arbitrary action profile y ∈ Y ,
construct a better reply path y = y1, y2, ..., yL until it can no
longer be extended. Note first that such a path cannot cycle
back on itself, because φ is strictly increasing along the path.
Since Y is finite, the path cannot be extended indefinitely.
Hence, the last element in a maximal better reply path from
any joint action, y, must be a Nash equilibrium of G.
This idea may be generalized as follows. The game G is
weakly acyclic if for any y ∈ Y , there exists a better reply
path starting at y and ending at some pure Nash equilibrium
of G [7], [8]. Potential games are special cases of weakly
acyclic games.
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B. Repeated Games
In a repeated game, at each time t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .},
each player Pi ∈ P simultaneously chooses an action
yi(t) ∈ Yi and receives the utility Ui(y(t)) where y(t) :=
(y1(t), . . . , yn(t)). Each player Pi ∈ P chooses his action
yi(t) at time t according to a probability distribution pi(t),
which we will refer to as the strategy of player Pi at time t. A
player’s strategy at time t can rely only on observations from
times {0, 1, 2, ..., t− 1}. Different learning algorithms are
specified by both the assumptions on available information
and the mechanism by which the strategies are updated as
information is gathered. For example, if a player knows the
functional form of his utility function and is capable of
observing the actions of all other players at every time step,
then the strategy adjustment mechanism of player Pi can be
written in the general form
pi(t) = Fi
(
y(0), ..., y(t− 1);Ui
)
.
An example of a learning algorithm, or strategy adjustment
mechanism, of this form is the well known fictitious play
[20]. For a detailed review of learning in games we direct
the reader to [5], [7], [8], [21], [22], [23].
In this paper we deal with the issue of whether players can
learn to play a pure Nash equilibrium through repeated inter-
actions under the most restrictive observational conditions;
players only have access to (i) the action they played and
(ii) the utility (possibly noisy) they received. In this setting,
the strategy adjustment mechanism of player Pi takes on the
form
pi(t) = Fi
({yi(k), Ui(y(k)) + νi(k)}k=0,1,...,t−1),
where the νi(t) are zero mean independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) random variables.
III. PAYOFF BASED LEARNING ALGORITHMS
In this section, we will introduce three simple payoff based
learning algorithms. The first, called Safe Experimentation,
guarantees convergence to a pure optimal Nash equilib-
rium in any identical interest game. Such an equilibrium
is optimal because each player’s utility is maximized. The
second learning algorithm, called Simple Experimentation,
guarantees convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium in any
weakly acyclic game. The third learning algorithm, called
Sample Experimentation, guarantees convergence to a pure
Nash equilibrium in any weakly acyclic game even when
utility measurements are corrupted with noise.
A. Safe Experimentation Dynamics for Identical Interest
Games
Before introducing the learning dynamics, we introduce
the following function. Let
Umaxi (t) := max
0≤τ≤t−1
Ui(y(τ))
be the maximum utility that player Pi has received up to
time t− 1.
We will now introduce the Safe Experimentation dynamics
for identical interest games.
1) Initialization: At time t = 0, each player randomly selects
and plays any action, yi(0). This action will be initially set
as the player’s baseline action at time t = 1 and is denoted
by ybi (1) = yi(0).
2) Action Selection: At each subsequent time step, each player
selects his baseline action with probability (1− ) or exper-
iments with a new random action with probability , i.e.:
• yi(t) = ybi (t) with probability (1− )
• yi(t) is chosen randomly (uniformly) over Yi with
probability 
The variable  will be referred to as the player’s exploration
rate.
3) Baseline Strategy Update: Each player compares the actual
utility received, Ui(y(t)), with the maximum received utility
Umaxi (t) and updates his baseline action as follows:
ybi (t + 1) =
{
yi(t), Ui(y(t)) > U
max
i (t);
ybi (t), Ui(y(t)) ≤ Umaxi (t).
This step is performed whether or not Step 2 involved
exploration.
4) Return to Step 2 and repeat.
The reason that this learning algorithm is called “Safe”
Experimentation is that the utility evaluated at the baseline
action, U(yb(t)), is non-decreasing with respect to time.
Theorem 3.1: Let G be a finite n-player identical interest
game in which all players use the Safe Experimentation
dynamics. Given any probability p < 1, if the exploration
rate  > 0 is sufficiently small, then for all sufficiently large
times t, y(t) is an optimal Nash equilibrium of G with at
least probability p.
The proof is omitted for brevity. See [1].
B. Simple Experimentation Dynamics for Weakly Acyclic
Games
We will now introduce the Simple Experimentation dy-
namics for weakly acyclic games. These dynamics will allow
us to relax the assumption of identical interest games.
1) Initialization: At time t = 0, each player randomly selects
and plays any action, yi(0). This action will be initially set
as the player’s baseline action at time 1, i.e., ybi (1) = yi(0).
Likewise, the player’s baseline utility at time 1 is initialized
as ubi (1) = Ui(y(0)).
2) Action Selection: At each subsequent time step, each player
selects his baseline action with probability (1− ) or exper-
iments with a new random action with probability .
• yi(t) = ybi (t) with probability (1− )
• yi(t) is chosen randomly (uniformly) over Yi with
probability 
The variable  will be referred to as the player’s exploration
rate. Whenever yi(t) = ybi (t), we will say that player Pi
experimented.
3) Baseline Action and Baseline Utility Update: Each player
compares the utility received, Ui(y(t)), with his baseline
utility, ubi(t), and updates his baseline action and utility as
follows:
• If player Pi experimented (i.e., yi(t) = ybi (t)) and if
Ui(y(t)) > u
b
i(t) then
– ybi (t + 1) = yi(t),
– ubi (t + 1) = Ui(y(t)).
• If player Pi experimented and if Ui(y(t)) ≤ ubi (t) then
– ybi (t + 1) = y
b
i (t),
– ubi (t + 1) = u
b
i (t).
• If player Pi did not experiment (i.e., yi(t) = ybi (t)) then
– ybi (t + 1) = y
b
i (t),
– ubi (t + 1) = Ui(y(t)).
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4) Return to Step 2 and repeat.
As before, these dynamics require only utility measure-
ments, and hence almost no information regarding the struc-
ture of the game.
Theorem 3.2: Let G be a finite n-player weakly acyclic
game in which all players use the Simple Experimentation
dynamics. Given any probability p < 1, if the exploration
rate  > 0 is sufficiently small, then for all sufficiently
large times t, y(t) is a Nash equilibrium of G with at least
probability p.
The proof is omitted for brevity. See [1].
C. Sample Experimentation Dynamics for Weakly Acyclic
Games with Noisy Utility Measurements
In this section we will focus on developing payoff based
dynamics for which the limiting behavior exhibits that of
a pure Nash equilibrium with arbitrarily high probability in
any finite weakly acyclic game even in the presence of utility
noise. We will show that a variant of the so-called Regret
Testing algorithm [9] accomplishes this objective for weakly
acyclic games with noisy utility measurements.
We now introduce Sample Experimentation dynamics.
1) Initialization: At time t = 0, each player randomly selects
and plays any action, yi(0) ∈ Yi. This action will be initially
set as the player’s baseline action, ybi (1) = yi(0).
2) Exploration Phase: After the baseline action is set, each
player engages in an exploration phase over the next m
periods. The length of the exploration phase need not be the
same or synchronized for each player. For convenience, we
will double index the time of the actions played as
yˇ(t1, t2) = y(m t1 + t2)
where t1 indexes the number of the exploration phase and
t2 indexes the actions played in that exploration phase. We
will refer to t1 as the exploration phase time and t2 as
the exploration action time. By construction, the exploration
phase time and exploration action time satisfy t1 ≥ 1 and
m ≥ t2 ≥ 1. The baseline action will only be updated at
the end of the exploration phase and will therefore only be
indexed by the exploration phase time.
During the exploration phase, each player selects his baseline
action with probability (1 − ) or experiments with a new
random action with probability . That is, for any exploration
phase time t1 ≥ 1 and for any exploration action time
satisfying m ≥ t2 ≥ 1,
• yˇi(t1, t2) = ybi (t1) with probability (1− ),
• yˇi(t1, t2) is chosen randomly (uniformly) over (Yi \
ybi (t1)) with probability .
Again, the variable  will be referred to as the player’s
exploration rate.
3) Action Assessment: After the exploration phase, each player
evaluates the average utility received when playing each of
his actions during the exploration phase. Let nyii (t1) be the
number of times that player Pi played action yi during the
exploration phase at time t1. The average utility for action
yi during the exploration phase at time t1 if n
yi
i (t1) > 0 is
Vˆ yii (t1) =
1
nyii (t1)
m∑
t2=1
I{yi = yˇi(t1, t2)}Ui(yˇ(t1, t2)),
otherwise Vˆ yii (t1) = Umin. The function I{·} is the usual
indicator function and Umin satisfies
Umin < min
i
min
y∈Y
Ui(y).
In words, Umin is less than the smallest payoff any agent can
receive.
4) Evaluation of Better Response Set: Each player compares
the average utility received when playing his baseline action,
Vˆ
ybi (t)
i (t1), with the average utility received for each of his
other actions, Vˆ yii (t1), and finds all played actions which
performed δ better than the baseline action. The term δ will
be referred to as the players’ tolerance level. Define Y ∗i (t1)
to be the set of actions that outperformed the baseline action
as follows:
Y ∗i (t1) =
{
yi ∈ Yi : Vˆ yii (t1) ≥ Vˆ y
b
i (t1)
i (t1) + δ
}
. (2)
5) Baseline Strategy Update: Each player updates his baseline
action as follows:
• If Y ∗i (t1) = ∅, then ybi (t1 + 1) = ybi (t1).
• If Y ∗i (t1) = ∅, then
– With probability ω, set ybi (t1+1) = y
b
i (t1). (We will
refer to ω as the player’s inertia.)
– With probability 1−ω, randomly select ybi (t1+1) ∈
Y ∗i (t1) with uniform probability.
6) Return to Step 2 and repeat.
Before stating the theorem we define the constant α > 0
as follows:
α := min{|Ui(y1)− Ui(y2)| > 0 : y1, y2 ∈ Y,Pi ∈ P}.
Theorem 3.3: Let G be a finite n-player weakly acyclic
game in which all players use the Sample Experimentation
dynamics. For any
• probability p < 1,
• tolerance level δ ∈ (0, α),
• inertia ω ∈ (0, 1), and
• sufficiently small exploration rate  > 0,
if the exploration phase length m is sufficiently large, then
for all sufficiently large times t > 0, y(t) is a Nash
equilibrium of G with at least probability p.
The proof is omitted for brevity. See [1]. Theorem 3.3 can
easily be extended to the case where players receive a noisy
measurement of their true utility [1], i.e.,
U˜i(yi, y−i) = Ui(yi, y−i) + νi,
where νi is an i.i.d. random variable with zero mean.
IV. INFLUENCING NASH EQUILIBRIA IN RESOURCE
ALLOCATION PROBLEMS
In this section we will derive an approach for influencing
the Nash equilibria of a resource allocation problem using
the idea of marginal cost pricing. We will illustrate the setup
and our approach on a congestion game which is an example
of a resource allocation problem.
A. Congestion Game Setup
In order to define a congestion game, we must specify the
action set, Yi, and the utility function, Ui(·), of each player.
Towards this end, let R denote a finite set of “resources”.
For each resource r ∈ R, there is an associated “congestion
function” cr : {0, 1, 2, ...} → R that reflects the cost of using
the resource as a function of the number of players using that
resource.
The action set, Yi, of each player, Pi, is defined as the
set of resources available to player Pi, i.e., Yi ⊂ 2R, where
2R denotes the set of subsets of R. Accordingly, an action
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yi ∈ Yi, reflects a selection of (multiple) resources, yi ⊂ R.
A player is “using” resource r if r ∈ yi. For an action profile
y ∈ Y1 × · · · × Yn, let σr(y) denote the total number of
players using resource r, i.e., |{i : r ∈ yi}|. In a congestion
game, the utility of player Pi using resources indicated by yi
depends only on the total number of players using the same
resources. More precisely, the utility of player Pi is defined
as
Ui(y) =
∑
r∈yi
cr(σr(y)). (3)
Any congestion game with utility functions as in (3) is a
potential game [24] with potential function
φˆ(y) =
∑
r∈R
σr(y)∑
k=1
cr(k).
B. Congestion Game with Tolls Setup
One approach for equilibrium manipulation is to influence
players’ utilities with tolls [25]. In a congestion game with
tolls, a player’s utility takes on the form
Ui(y) =
∑
r∈yi
cr(σr(y)) + tr(σr(y)),
where tr(k) is the toll imposed on resource r if there are k
users.
Suppose that the global planner is interested in minimizing
a general measure
φ(y) :=
∑
r∈R
fr(σr(y))cr(σr(y)), (4)
where fr : {0, 1, 2, ...} → R is any arbitrary function.
An example of an objective function that fits within this
framework is the total congestion experienced by all drivers
on the network, which can be evaluated
Tc(y) :=
∑
r∈R
σr(y)cr(σr(y)).
Proposition 4.1: Consider a congestion game of any net-
work topology. If the imposed tolls are set as
tr(k) = (fr(k)− 1)cr(k)− fr(k − 1)cr(k − 1), ∀k ≥ 1,
then the global planners objective, φ(y), is a potential
function for the congestion game with tolls.
The proof is omitted for brevity. See [1].
V. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE – CONGESTION GAME
We will consider a discrete representation of the con-
gestion game setup considered in Braess’ Paradox [26]. In
our setting, there are 1000 vehicles that need to traverse
through the network. The network topology and associated
congestion functions are illustrated in Figure 1. Each vehicle
can select one of the four possible paths to traverse across the
network. The unique Nash equilibrium is when all vehicles
take the highlighted route which yields a utility of 2 to each
vehicle and a total congestion of 2000.
Since a potential game is weakly acyclic, the payoff
based learning dynamics in this paper are applicable learning
algorithms for this congestion game. In a congestion game,
a payoff based learning algorithms means that drivers have
Fig. 1. Illustration of Nash Equilibrium and Evolution of Number of
Vehicles on Each Road Using Simple Experimentation Dynamics.
access only to the actual congestion experienced. Drivers are
unaware of the congestion level on any alternative routes.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of drivers on routes when using
the Simple Experimentation dynamics with an exploration
rate of  = 0.25%. One can observe that the vehicles’
collective behavior does indeed approach that of the Nash
equilibrium.
It is easy to verify that this vehicle distribution does not
minimize the total congestion experienced by all drivers
over the network. The distribution that minimizes the total
congestion over the network is when half the vehicles occupy
the top two roads and the other half occupy the bottom two
roads. The middle road (pink) is irrelevant.
One can employ the tolling scheme developed in the
previous section to locally influence vehicle behavior to
achieve this objective. In this setting, the new cost func-
tions, i.e. congestion plus tolls, are illustrated in Figure 2,
which also shows the evolution of drivers on routes when
Fig. 2. Illustration of Nash Equilibrium and Evolution of Number
of Vehicles on Each Road Using Simple Experimentation Dynamics in
Congestion Game with Tolls.
using the Simple Experimentation dynamics. This simulation
used an exploration rate of  = 0.25%. When using this
tolling scheme, the vehicles’ collective behavior approaches
the new Nash equilibrium which now minimizes the total
congestion experienced on the network. The total congestion
experienced on the network is now approximately 1500.
In many applications, players may not have access to their
true utility, but do have access to a noisy measurement of
their utility. For example, in the traffic setting, this noisy
measurement could be the result of accidents or weather
conditions. We will revisit the original congestion game
(without tolls) as illustrated in Figure 1. We will now assume
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that a driver’s utility measurement takes on the form
U˜i(y) =
∑
r∈yi
cr(σr(y)) + νi,
where νi is a random variable with zero mean and variance
of 0.1. We will assume that the noise is driver specific rather
than road specific.
Figure 3 shows a comparison of the evolution of drivers on
routes when using the Simple and Sample Experimentation
dynamics. The Simple Experimentation dynamics simulation
used an exploration rate  = 0.25%. The Sample Exper-
imentation dynamics simulation used an exploration rate
 = 0.25%, a tolerance level δ = 0.002, an exploration phase
length m = 500000, and inertia ω = 0.85. As expected, the
noisy utility measurements influenced vehicle behavior more
in the Simple Experimentation dynamics than the Sample
Experimentation dynamics.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of Evolution of Number of Vehicles on Each Road
Using Simple Experimentation Dynamics and Sample Experimentation
Dynamics (baseline) with Noisy Utility Measurements
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have introduced Safe Experimentation dynamics for
identical interest games, Simple Experimentation dynamics
for weakly acyclic games with noise-free utility measure-
ments, and Sample Experimentation dynamics for weakly
acyclic games with noisy utility measurements. For all three
settings, we have shown that for sufficiently large times,
the joint action taken by players will constitute a Nash
equilibrium. Furthermore, we have shown how to guarantee
that a collective objective in a congestion game is a (non-
unique) Nash equilibrium.
Our motivation has been that in many engineered systems,
the functional forms of utility functions are not available, and
so players must adjust their strategies through an adaptive
process using only payoff measurements. In the dynamic
processes defined here, there is no explicit cooperation or
communication between players. On the one hand, this lack
of explicit coordination offers an element of robustness to a
variety of uncertainties in the strategy adjustment processes.
Nonetheless, an interesting future direction would be to in-
vestigate to what degree explicit coordination through limited
communications could be beneficial.
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